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A. Texas Penal Code-General Provisions
1. Burden of Proof in Competency Hearings
HE defendant in Manning v. StateI was charged with and convicted
of attempted murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Previously,
however, a Fort Worth court had adjudged the defendant incompe-
tent to stand trial and ordered the defendant to be sent to Rusk State Hospi-
tal. At a pretrial competency hearing the defense relied on the unvacated
prior judgment of incompetency to support the theory that the defendant
was incompetent to stand trial.2 The trial court instructed the jury that the
state bore the burden of proof of competency and must satisfy that burden
by proving the defendant's competency by a preponderance of the evidence.3
The court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction, finding the instruction
to be error so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial
trial.4 Relying on a long line of cases, 5 the court noted:
The rule in Texas is also well settled that wherever insanity has been
shown to exist, as by a prior judgment of the court, the presumption is
that the insanity continues and the burden is upon the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of
the offense. 6
The court held that the unvacated prior adjudication of incompetency was
sufficient to fulfill the defendant's burden of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was insane, thereby shifting to the state the more oner-
ous burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'
2. Voluntary Conduct
In Joiner v. States the defendant was convicted of murder. The issue
* B.B.A., University of Texas; J.D., University of Houston. Attorney at Law, Haynes &
Fullenweider, Houston, Texas.
1. 730 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
2. Id. at 745.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 750.
5. Id. at 746.
6. Id. (emphasis in original).
7. Id. at 749.
8. 727 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
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before the court of criminal appeals was whether the trial court erred by
failing to submit a requested charge on whether the defendant's conduct was
voluntary. Evidence reflected that the defendant, Joiner, and the deceased,
Edith Smith, became involved in an altercation at a nightclub in San
Antonio. During the altercation, Joiner pulled out a gun and shot Smith.
Immediately after the shot, Joiner stated "Oh, my God, I done killed her,"
and "[i]t was an accident."9
The defendant argued on appeal that the statement "[i]t was an accident"
raised an issue as to whether or not the defendant's conduct was voluntary.
The appeals court disagreed, holding that "it" as used by the defendant was
ambiguous.' 0 In addition, relying on George v. State"I the court found vol-
untary conduct in the defendant's carrying of a concealed gun, drawing the
gun, pointing it at the deceased from a distance of two or three inches, and'
shooting her in the face.' 2 On that basis the court held that the evidence did
not raise the issue of voluntariness.' 3
The Corpus Christi court of appeals in Gaona v. State ' 4 also rejected an
affirmative jury charge on involuntary conduct after finding sufficient evi-
dence of surrounding voluntary conduct. In Gaona the defendant, Gaona,
entered into a playful wrestling match with a friend and neighbor, Rodulfo.
The wrestling match became too rough for Gaona, so he went into the
house, got a .22 caliber rifle, went back outside, and killed Rodulfo. At trial
Gaona testified that he had not intended to kill Rodulfo, in fact, he had not
even intended to pull the trigger. According to Gaona, when the gun went
off he was pointing it at the ground, not at Rodulfo. He also stated that the
gun "just went off ... I must have slipped or something."' 5
Gaona was charged with murder, involuntary manslaughter, and crimi-
nally negligent homicide. The jury convicted Gaona of involuntary man-
slaughter. Gaona, however, attempted to raise the "accidental death"
theory by requesting a jury charge on voluntary conduct, or lack thereof.' 6
The court held that Gaona's testimony was insufficient to raise the voluntari-
ness issue,' 7 stating that "I must have slipped" was "more in the nature of
speculation rather than concrete evidence that an independent precipitating
event was the real culprit,"' 8 and that the voluntary acts of getting the gun,
loading it, and holding his finger on the trigger were sufficient predicate acts
to satisfy the requirements for voluntary conduct enumerated in George v.
9. Id. at 535.
10. Id. at 537.
11. 681 S.W.2d 43, 45-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
12. Joiner, 727 S.W.2d at 537.
13. Id.
14. 733 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.).
15. Id. at 616.
16. Id. at 615.
17. Note that both Joiner, and Gaona speak in terms of the evidence being "insufficient"
to raise a jury issue. The standard for supporting a charge to the jury, however, should be a
"no evidence" test. Query as to whether the proper standard was actually used in these cases.




B. Defenses-Duty to Retreat
The case of Hughes v. State20 involved the court in an in-depth analysis of
the duty to retreat under the self-defense 2 and defense of a third party22
provisions of the Texas Penal Code. The defendant was indicted for murder
and convicted of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. The shooting
was the result of a lovers' quarrel, and apparently began with an argument
between John Hughes and the victim, Rodney Johnson, over Johnson's ex-
girlfriend, Joan Goodwin. A few days after that quarrel, Hughes and Good-
win passed Johnson on the highway. Johnson turned around and began fol-
lowing them. Hughes and Goodwin pulled over to the side of the road and
got out of the car to talk to Johnson. Goodwin testified that while she was
talking to Johnson, he grabbed for her, pulled a gun, and threatened to kill
both Hughes and Goodwin. Hughes, however, also had a gun and promptly
shot and killed Johnson.
The trial court instructed the jury on the law of self-defense and the law of
defense of a third party.23 The self-defense charge was not disputed. As to
the charge of defense of a third party, the trial court imposed a duty to
retreat if a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would have done
SO. 2 4 This reference was in both the law and the application of law to the
facts of the case. The court of criminal appeals held that the instruction was
erroneous, but nonetheless found that there is a duty to retreat when acting
in defense of a third person.25 The court, however, determined that, in this
context, it is not the perception of the actor alone that is significant. Rather,
the actor must make an assessment, from his standpoint, that a reasonable
person in the position of the third person would not have retreated prior to
his lawfully acting with deadly force on the third person's behalf.26
The court was far from unanimous in its analysis. Judge Teague filed a
concurring opinion in which he essentially stated that it is ridiculous to re-
quire an actor to make an independent assessment of whether or not the
third person should or would retreat before taking action.27 Judge Teague
advocated the position that the law of retreat was not intended to pervade
section 9.33.28 Rather, section 9.33 was intended to encourage and provide
protection for good samaritans.29 Judge Miller, joined by Judge W.C. Davis,
19. Id.; supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. 719 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
21. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
22. Id. § 9.33 (Vernon 1974).
23. Hughes, 719 S.W.2d at 562.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 564-65.
26. Id. at 565.
27. Id. at 568-69.
28. Id. at 568.
29. Id.; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Basically, this was the
position taken by the Tyler court of appeals in reversing Hughes's conviction at that level. See
Dobbs v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 113, 100 S.W. 946, 949 (1907); Hughes v. State, 721 S.W.2d 356,
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dissented, noting a conflict in the statutes regarding the retreat provision.30
Judge Miller would resolve this conflict by applying the retreat requirement
of section 9.32 to the provisions of section 9.33.31
Although stated in different terms, the four in the minority were arguably
saying the same thing: the purpose in having a defense of defense of a third
party is to encourage citizens to get involved in potentially violent situations
for the purpose of protecting innocent people.32 This purpose is undermined
by requiring the good samaritan to put himself in the shoes of the third party
to decide whether he should retreat or not. By doing so, if he makes the
wrong judgment, the good samaritan is then punished for his chivalrous act.
The diverging arguments of the court indicate that it is likely to revisit this
area.
Bennett v. State 33 involved the propriety of charging the jury as to defense
of a third person on behalf of the victim. The defendant, Bennett, was upset
because of his daughter's relationship with one Mark Rattan, believing Rat-
tan had spent the night with his daughter. Bennett confronted Rattan in the
daughter's apartment, assaulted him, and ordered him to leave. The next
day, Bennett took his .357 magnum handgun and went to Rattan's house,
ostensibly to scare Rattan away from his daughter. Bennett and Rattan sat
in Bennett's truck so they could talk. Rattan's father and his father's friend,
Tom DeRushia, who knew of the altercation of the previous day, both got
guns and approached Bennett's truck. DeRushia reached in and grabbed
Bennett's shoulder, turning him around. Bennett saw the gun and fired at
DeRushia, killing him.
Both parties agreed that the trial court gave a proper jury instruction on
the law of self-defense. However, the trial court also gave an instruction on
defense of a third person and in the application of law to facts essentially
instructed that "if the jury believed that DeRushia was justified in using
deadly force against [Bennett] in defense of Rattan, and that [Bennett] him-
self reasonably believed that DeRushia was so justified, it should find against
[Bennett] in his claim of self-defense." 34 Before the court of criminal ap-
peals, the defense argued that this instruction improperly restricted Ben-
nett's right to self-defense because it hinged Bennett's right to self-defense to
359 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, pet. granted)(citing Crawford v. State, 629 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1982, no pet.).
30. Hughes, 719 S.W.2d at 571.
31. Id. at 571-72. As Judge Miller stated in his solution:
[Where the circumstances raise the possibility of use of deadly force in defense
of a third party, and if the actor may retreat and still preserve the safety of the
third party he or she seeks to protect, then the actor must retreat and not exercise
deadly force against the attacker.
Id. (emphasis in original).
32. In his concurrence, Judge Teague stated: "Section 9.33 ... was clearly intended to
'encourage and to afford protection to "good samaritans" by removing their legal doubts,
which might impede crime prevention and deter those who witness violent assaults upon per-
sons, but who otherwise would aid an apparent victim of criminal violence.'" Id. at 586 (cit-
ing Alexander v. State, 52 Md. App. 171, 447 A.2d 880, 884 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)).
33. 726 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
34. Id. at 35 (emphasis in original).
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DeRushia's, rather than Bennett's belief and the reasonableness of his con-
duct.35 The state argued that the charge of defense of a third person was a
"logical extension of the 'provoking the difficulty' limitation on self-defense"
under section 9.3 l(b)(4) of the Texas Penal Code.36
Although the court rejected the state's theory, it nonetheless held that the
charge was proper. In doing so, the court held that "[w]here the evidence
raises some question whether the deceased's conduct was justified .... the
deceased becomes 'a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue' in the
case." 37 Consequently, DeRushia's conduct was at issue in the trial. Be-
cause the court's instruction allowed the jury to reject Bennett's self-defense
theory only if it believed DeRushia's actions were lawful and if it found that
Bennett himself, at the moment he acted, also reasonably believed DeRushia
acted lawfully, the right to self-defense was not impaired.
38
The defendant in Dubose v. State 39 was convicted of unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle pursuant to section 31.07 of the Texas Penal Code.4° The
vehicle in question had been rented from Avis on July 21, 1985. The car was
returned on July 26, 1985, and left outside the Avis office with the keys and
rental contract over the visor. Dubose was arrested on August 13th for go-
ing the wrong way on a one-way street, and the arresting officer subsequently
determined that the car was stolen.
At trial, the defendant testified that he had borrowed the car from some-
one else, "Fast Eddie," and that he believed that Eddie had rented the car
from Avis because he had seen some papers with "Avis" printed on them.
The defendant further testified that Eddie had given him the keys to the car
and given him permission to use it. The trial court refused the defendant's
requested special instruction as to mistake of fact. The court held that
Dubose's testimony was sufficient to raise the defense of mistake of fact be-
cause it was evidence that he was allowed to use the car by one who was




In the involuntary manslaughter case of William v. State42 the issue
35. Id.
36. Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(4) (Vernon 1974).
37. 726 S.W.2d at 36.
38. Id. at 38. The court also noted that the instruction, although proper, was not a model
of clarity. If the defendant had objected to the charge as to third party defense on grounds of
misleading and confusing the jury, perhaps the court would have proposed an appropriate
instruction to use under similar circumstances.
39. 732 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no pet.).
40. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an
offense if he intentionally or knowingly operates another's boat, airplane, or motor-propelled
vehicle without the effective consent of the owner."
41. 732 S.W.2d at 383-84 (relying on Lynch v. State, 643 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983); Bonner v. State, 426 S.W.2d 869, 870-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Abram v. State,
700 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd)).
42. 725 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
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before the court was whether courts should consider a motorboat a "motor
vehicle" for purposes of section 19.05(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code.4 3 The
defendant collided with a capsized sailboat, killing one of the occupants of
the sailboat. Results of an intoxilyzer test indicated a 0.14% alcohol concen-
tration in the defendant.
The state chose to charge the defendant with involuntary manslaughter
pursuant to the "operating motor vehicle while intoxicated" provision of
subsection (2), rather than with recklessly causing the death of an individual
under section 19.05(a)(1). 44 Judge Campbell, writing for the majority, re-
jected the state's argument that the definition of "vehicle" found in other
chapters of the Texas Penal Code should be extended to encompass the term
"motor vehicle" that appears in section 19.05(a)(2). 45 Instead, Judge Camp-
bell traced the history of section 19.05 and found that the statute was in-
tended to apply only to a vehicle that travels on a public road or highway. 46
Because this provision did not encompass the situation involving a motor-
boat, the state had failed to charge an offense against the laws of the State of
Texas, and the court of appeals' opinion reversing defendant's conviction
was affirmed. 47
In another involuntary manslaughter case, Lopez v. State,48 the main issue
before the court was whether the trial court and prosecutor erred in voir dire
proceedings by injecting the per se definition of intoxication into their ques-
tioning. The indictment had charged that defendant's intoxication, his fail-
ure to keep a proper lookout, and his failure to maintain a single marked
lane, were all factors leading to the accident. The court held that because
the per se definition was not applicable to an involuntary manslaughter case,
the action of the judge and the prosecutor was error.49 Nevertheless, the
error was deemed harmless because the court, prior to submitting the case to
the jury, had instructed that the intoxication paragraph be abandoned and
dismissed.5 0 The major dispute in this case has been resolved because of
recent legislative action concerning section 19.05 relating to involuntary
manslaughter."'
43. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a)(2) (Vernon 1974). At the time of this case,
§ 19.05(a)(2) provided: "A person commits an offense if he: ... (2) by accident or mistake
when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and, by reason of such intoxication, causes
the death of an individual." Id.
44. Id. § 19.05(a)(1) provides: "A person commits an offense if he: (1) recklessly causes
the death of an individual ... 
45. 725 S.W.2d at 261.
46. Id.
47. Id. It should be noted that the legislature amended section 19.05 during the 1987
session to specifically incorporate airplanes, helicopters, and boats within the voluntary man-
slaughter provisions; infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
48. 731 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no pet.).
49. Id. at 686.
50. Id. at 687.




In Miranda v. State 52 the defendant was charged with murder and found
guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, the defend-
ant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding from
the jury instructions a charge on criminally negligent homicide. 53 The court
of appeals affirmed the conviction, finding no evidence to support an issue on
criminally negligent homicide. 54
While the Miranda opinion contains nothing particularly surprising, it
provides an excellent synopsis of the law regarding criminally negligent
homicide:
The essence of criminal negligence is the failure of the actor to perceive
the risk created by his conduct. Before a charge on this particular
crime is required, the record must contain evidence that shows the de-
fendant was unaware of the risk his conduct was creating. Evidence that
raises the awareness issue includes a defendant's familiarity with a gun,
its potential for injury, how the weapon was actually fired and other
attendant circumstances. The credibility of the evidence, the source of
the evidence, and whether it conflicts with other evidence is not
considered. 55
In Miranda the defendant testified that he shot at the victim to get the
victim away from himself. The court concluded that this testimony was evi-
dence that he perceived the risk of harm his conduct created.56 The court,
apparently, concluded that this evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Miranda was aware of the risk; thus, a charge on
criminal negligence was unnecessary.57
The defendant in Gonzales v. State 58 got into a fight with DeAnda outside
a local bar. After being knocked down by DeAnda, the defendant ran to his
truck, got a gun, and shot and killed DeAnda. At trial Gonzales testified
that he did not intend either to kill or to injure DeAnda, but only to scare
him. The judge instructed the jury on the offenses of voluntary manslaugh-
ter, involuntary manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide. 59 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that Gonzales's testimony was sufficient to
raise the issue of lack of intent to kill and he was therefore entitled to a
charge on the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. 6°
52. 739 S.W.2d 473 (Tex App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.).
53. Id. at 474.
54. Id. at 475.
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 733 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no pet.).
59. Id. at 591 n.2. The facts of this case are similar to those recited in Miranda v. State,
739 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (discussed supra at notes 52-
57 and accompanying text), in which the Corpus Christi court held that the defendant was not
entitled to a charge on criminally negligent homicide. Perhaps this case provides another ex-
ample of proving the old adage "it never hurts to ask."
60. 733 S.W.2d at 591.
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3. Injury to an Elderly Individual
A son living with his 94-year-old mother was the background for Billing-
slea v. State.61 The mother became bed-ridden and ultimately died, allegedly
because her son, the defendant, failed to provide or obtain medical treatment
for her. The defendant was indicted and convicted pursuant to section
22.04(a)(10) of the Texas Penal Code based on his failure to act.62 The court
reversed the conviction, concluding that in order to sustain a conviction
based on omission or failure to act, there must first be a statutory duty to
act.63 Although the defendant undoubtedly had a moral obligation or com-
mon law duty to care for his mother, and thereby seek medical attention for
her, his breach of these duties was not a sufficient basis for criminal
liability.64
4. Enticing a Child
Cunyus v. State65 involved a defendant charged under Texas Penal Code
section 25.04, which prohibits interfering with the lawful custody of a
child. 66 The record reflected that Cunyus, the defendant, was playing games
with several little boys and buying them refreshments. Cunyus told some of
the children that he would buy them beer if they would go to a movie with
him. One of the children called his parents to ask permission to go to the
movie, but was told not to go with a stranger. As a result none of the boys
went to the movie. Later, Cunyus took several of the boys home in the back
of his pickup and enroute threw some dirty books back for them to look at.
Otherwise, Cunyus took the boys straight home without incident.
While finding the defendant's conduct intolerable, the court held the evi-
dence insufficient to sustain a conviction because the defendant had not in-
terfered with the parents' ability to control or raise their child.67 The court
stated that "the mere offer of an activity to a child which would remove the
child from where the parents or legal guardians have permitted the child to
61. 734 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.).
62. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988) provides: "A person
commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by
act or omission, engages in conduct that causes to a child who is 14 years of age or younger or
to an individual who is 65 years of age or older: (1) Serious bodily injury ... 
63. Billingslea, 734 S.W.2d at 425.
64. Id. The facts of this case were horrible, including allegations of bedsores and rotting
flesh. The issue, of course, presents quite a dilemma. Lack of a specific statutory duty some-
times leads to this kind of distasteful result. Creating such a duty, however, may well en-
courage others to abandon their parents entirely since it is unlikely that an absolute duty
would be constitutional. Perhaps this is the kind of situation where we have to rely on the
basic moral fiber of our society to act appropriately rather than risk collapse of the familial
structure by expanding criminal responsibility.
65. 727 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
66. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.04(a) (Vernon 1974) provides:
A person commits an offense if, with the intent to interfere with the lawful cus-
tody of a child younger than 18 years, he knowingly entices, persuades, or takes
the child from the custody of the parent or guardian or person standing in the
stead of the parent or guardian of such child.
67. 727 S.W.2d at 565.
[Vol. 42
CRIMINAL LAW
be will not alone constitute an offense." 68
5. Securing Execution of Document by Deception
In Mills v.State,69 an insurance fraud case, the court held that the defend-
ant could have been charged under either section 31.03 (the general theft
statute) or section 32.46 (securing by deception) of the Texas Penal Code.70
Under section 31.03 the alleged offense was a second degree felony, while
under section 32.46 the alleged offense was a third degree felony. 71 The state
chose to charge the defendant with a second degree felony under section
31.03. On appeal the defendant argued that the two statutes were in pari
materia, and thus the state was required to charge under the statute with the
lesser punishment. 72 The court concluded that the two statutes were not in
pari materia because the theft statute penalizes acquisitive conduct, while
section 32.45 targets deceptive conduct.73 Consequently, the court held both
statutes to be broad and general statutes requiring different elements of proof
and having different purposes and objectives, neither considered to control
the other.74 Because section 32.46 is not a more specialized version of theft,
the state was allowed to charge under the offense that gave the greater
punishment.7"
6. Offenses Against Public Administration
In Emerson v. State76 the defendant, a Houston police officer, was charged
with "official oppression" for his act of detaining a female to coerce her to
have sexual intercourse with him. Official oppression is a misdemeanor
under section 39.02 of the Texas Penal Code. 77 The sole issue before the
court was whether the district court had jurisdiction to try this misdemeanor
offense.78 Noting that article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution79 and
68. Id.
69. 722 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
70. Id. at 416.
71. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(5)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988); id. § 32.46(b)
(Vernon 1974).
72. 722 S.W.2d at 412.
73. Id. at 415.
74. Id. at 416.
75. Id.
76. 727 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
77. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.02 (Vernon 1974) provides:
(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits
an offense if he: (1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to
arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he
knows is unlawful; or (2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exer-
cise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his con-
duct is unlawful.
(b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office
or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes ad-
vantage of such actual or purported capacity.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
78. 737 S.W.2d at 269.
79. TEX. CONST. art. V § 8 provides: "The District Court shall have original jurisdiction
1988]
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article 4.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure80 give district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over all misdemeanors involving "official misconduct,"
the court held that the offense of official oppression fell within this
provision.81
7. Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, and Morals
The court in Adley v. State,82 a case involving a conviction for the felony
offense of gambling promotion, struck down section 47.03(a)(2) of the Texas
Penal Code83 as unconstitutionally vague. 84 In doing so, the court agreed
with the state's argument that an individual can make and receive a bet si-
multaneously. 85 The court, however, interpreted the legislative intent be-
hind the passage of section 47.03 as targeting for prosecution only the
professional, exploitive gambler.86 Because the legislature failed to define
the conduct of "receiving a bet" precisely enough to meet this intent, the
statute was held to be unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable as a penal
sanction.8 7
D. Controlled Substances Act
1. Possession
The basis of the conviction in Humason v. State88 was possession of less
than 28 grams of cocaine under sections 4.04(a), and 4.02(b)(3)(D) of the
Controlled Substances Act.89 The record reflected that the defendant was
stopped for speeding and subsequently arrested for driving with a suspended
driver's license. After the arrest, the police officer searched the defendant's
vehicle. During that search, the officer discovered an unzipped cloth gym
bag on the front passenger seat. The bag contained clothing, a towel, aspirin
bottles, and a clear vial. Chemical analysis resulted in the finding that the
vial contained .03 grams of cocaine. At the time of the arrest the defendant
in all criminal cases of the grade of felony; ... of all misdemeanors involving official miscon-
duct .. "
80. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.05 (Vernon Supp. 1988) provides: "District
courts and criminal district courts shall have original jurisdiction in criminal cases of the grade
of felony, of all misdemeanors involving official misconduct, and of misdemeanor cases trans-
ferred to the district court under Article 4.17 of this code."
81. 737 S.W.2d at 268-69.
82. 718 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
83. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 47.03 (Vernon 1974) provided: "(a) A person commits an
offense if he intentionally or knowingly does any of the following acts:... (2) receives, records,
or forwards a bet or offer to bet ..
84. 718 S.W.2d at 685.
85. Id. at 684.
86. Id. at 685.
87. Id.
88. 728 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
89. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.04(a) (Vernon 1976) (repealed 1981)
provided: "Except as authorized by this Act, a person commits an offense if he knowingly or
intentionally possesses a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from,
or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice." Section 4.02(b)(3)(D) of the Controlled Substances Act incorporated
cocaine into penalty group 1. Id. art. 4476-15, § 4.02(b)(3)(D).
[Vol. 42
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was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Citing the need to provide evidence of
"affirmative links" between a defendant and a controlled substance, the
court held the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction.90 The court
held that while the particular circumstances could lead a trier-of-fact to con-
clude that "appellant knowingly exercised actual care, custody, control or
management over the cocaine in the gym bag," the same circumstances
could just as rationally lead to the opposite conclusion, that the appellant
was oblivious of the cocaine amongst his possessions. 91
2. Court of Appeals Cases
In Saenz v. State 92 the defendant was convicted of aggravated delivery of
marijuana under section 4.05 of the Controlled Substances Act.93 Seventy
packages of marijuana, totaling 78.9 pounds, were confiscated. At trial,
however, testimony revealed that the 78.9 pounds included seeds and stems
in the calculation. The state's drug expert testified that he could not esti-
mate the amount of marijuana without the seeds and stems. The court held
the evidence insufficient to support a conviction since the statue specifically
excludes mature stalks and sterilized seeds from weight calculation. 94 The
court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, finding the evidence
sufficient to support a lesser included offense. 95
In Baty v. State 96 Baty, the defendant, was convicted of intentionally and
knowingly possessing more than 28 grams and less than 400 grams of am-
phetamines. 97 The Dallas court of appeals, however, held that the evidence
presented at the trial was insufficient to support a possession offense when
drugs found in the trunk of the car.98 Baty was stopped by a police officer
for a traffic violation and could not produce either a driver's license or proof
of insurance. The officer arrested Baty for those offenses, as well as the traf-
fic violations. In a search incident to the arrest, the officer found several
vials on Baty's person that contained amphetamines. Pursuant to a search of
the vehicle, the officer found a loaded .22 caliber pistol, and using a key in
Baty's possession, found drug paraphernalia and four plastic containers in
90. 728 S.W.2d at 365-66.
91. Id. at 366.
92. 733 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no pet.)
93. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.05 (Vernon Supp. 1988) provides:
"(a) Except as authorized by this Act, a person commits an offense if he knowingly or inten-
tionally delivers marijuana .... (c) A person commits an aggravated offense if the person
commits an offense under Subsection (a) of this section and the amount of marijuana delivered
is more than 50 pounds."
94. 733 S.W.2d at 267.
95. Id. at 267-68. Given that the state chose to proceed on the aggravated offense, rather
than the lesser included offense, retrial may be precluded as violative of double jeopardy.
96. 734 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.).
97. Id. at 62. The cause was brought pursuant to § 4.04(a) of the Controlled Substances
Act. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.04(a) (Vernon 1976) (repealed 1981); see
supra note 89. Section 4.02(c)(3) incorporates amphetamines into penalty group 2. TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.02(c)(3) (Vernon 1976) (repealed 1981).
98. 734 S.W.2d at 65.
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the vehicle's trunk. The substance in the containers were later identified as
257.7 grams of amphetamines.
At the time of the arrest, Baty was the sole occupant of the vehicle, but
the trial record did not reflect the identity of the owner of the vehicle. The
court held that the presence of a gun in the vehicle, the fact that Baty was
the sole occupant at the time of the arrest, and the finding of the vials on the
defendant's person, were insufficient to exclude the hypothesis that he was
unaware of the items found in the trunk of the car.99 Additionally, the evi-
dence showed that the amphetamines found on his person were of a different
purity level from the amphetamines found in the trunk, and this discrepancy
also weakened the affirmative links between the defendant and the amphet-
amines in the trunk of the vehicle. Because the state chose to prosecute Baty
for the larger amount of amphetamines in the vehicle's trunk, rather than
those found only on Baty's person, the court reversed the judgement and
ordered an acquittal. °°
Two recent court of appeals opinions have addressed the evidence neces-
sary to establish the affirmative link requirement in drug cases. In Leia v.
State'0' the defendant was convicted of aggravated possession of
methamphetamine. The San Antonio court of appeals affirmed the convic-
tion.102 The court determined that the evidence sufficiently linked Leija to
the drugs because: (1) at the time of the arrest, he told one of the arresting
officers that all the "stuff" in the bedroom was his; (2) evidence tended to
showed that Leija seemed relaxed and "at home" in the bedroom; (3) the
drugs were easily accessible to Leija; (4) the suspected drug paraphernalia
was in the bedroom and in clear view; (5) the house smelled of
methamphetamine and (6) Leija admitted at the time of arrest that he had
been "staying" in the bedroom with the drugs and alluded to that room as
"my room."' 103
Of these factors, the court found Leija's admission that the "stuff" in the
bedroom was his to be the most damaging. 04 At trial, Leija testified that he
made the admission only because he wanted to protect a woman present at
the time of arrest. Judge Chapa noted that this explanation was obviously
rejected by the jury as the trier-of-fact and the other factors were sufficient to
support a finding that defendant was aware of the methamphetamines.105
In Behring v. State '06 the defendant was also charged and convicted of
unlawful possession of methamphetamine. The record reflected that the ar-
resting officers found the defendant and others on the property in question
near a mobile home and another small house. The officers also found a
99. Id. at 64-65.
100. Id. at 65-66.
101. 738 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no pet.)
102. Id. at 751.
103. Id. (citing Hahn v. State, 502 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Herrera v. State,




106. 739 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.).
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trailer concealed from the road apparently set up as a methamphetamine lab.
In addition, the officers found a number of guns, which Behring testified
were hers, two radio scanners, flare gun primers, and in Behring's purse re-
ceipts for the purchase of ammunition. Police officers also testified to a heavy
odor that they recognized as methamphetamine in the mobile home and to
discovering women's clothing that also smelled of methamphetamine. The




Thomas v. State 10 was an action brought pursuant to Texas Revised Civil
Statutes article 6184m.109 The defendant, Thomas, while an inmate of the
Texas Department of Corrections, was convicted of the offense of furnishing
marijuana to an inmate,' 10 that inmate being himself. The Tyler court of
appeals clarified the definition of "furnish" as used in the statute to refer to
the act of furnishing a controlled substance to another party who is an in-
mate at a Texas penal institution.I' The court ordered Thomas's conviction
dismissed, holding that the definition does not cover mere possession."
12
One may not be convicted, therefore, of furnishing a controlled substance to
oneself under article 6184m.113
II. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
1987 marked the convening of the seventieth Texas State Legislature.
During the regular session the legislature passed a number of bills affecting
the Texas Penal Code and penal statutes in other codes. The changes and
additions discussed here are those that will have the greatest impact on the
day-to-day practice of criminal law.
107. Id. at 505. The court's rationale is set out in the following excerpt:
[s]he also had the strong odor of methamphetamine on her clothing and pro-
vided several of the guns, ammunition and flare primers which were clearly
designed to protect the illegal lab from possible intrusion. No other plausible
explanation except the appellant was part of the operation was given for this
evidence at trial and it is not the responsibility of this Court to entertain vague
and unsubstantiated speculation not raised by credible evidence as to what the
appellant might have been doing so heavily armed at the site of the lab. Id.
The opinion, however, cites no evidence to support the propositions that the clothing was in
fact that of the defendant, or that the guns, ammunition, and flare primers were "clearly
designed to protect the illegal lab from possible intrusion." Id. If a petition for discretionary
review is requested and granted in case, it will be interesting to see how the court of criminal
appeals deals with these unsubstantiated assertions in light of Humason. See supra notes 90-94
and accompanying text.
108. 733 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no pet.).
109. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6184m (Vernon Supp 1988): "It shall be unlawful
for any person to furnish, attempt to furnish, or assist in furnishing to any inmate of ... the
Texas Department of Corrections any.., controlled substance, or dangerous drug except from
the prescription of a physician."
110. 733 S.W.2d at 677.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 676-77.
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A. Penal Code-Miscellaneous Provisions"14
1. Joinder of Offenses
The legislature expanded section 3.01 to allow the state to join in the same
indictment two or more offenses committed during the same transaction, or
a common scheme or plan, as well as the repeated commission of the same
or similar offenses.' 15 The limitation that joinder applies only to Title 7,
Property Offenses, was eliminated." 16
2. Use of Force
The legislature amended section 9.53 to allow peace officers acting as jail-
ers or guards to use such force against a person in custody as the officer
reasonably believes is necessary to maintain the security of the institution
that the officer is guarding. 117 "Security" as used in the amendment is broad
enough to include a third-party defense provision. Thus, the guard can act
for the purpose of protecting other persons in custody or employees of the
institution.
3. Corporate Punishment
A fourth punishment category was added to section 12.51 dealing with
corporations.1 8 The new category provides for a $50,000 fine if the offense
was a felony or a class A misdemeanor and. an individual suffered serious
bodily injury or death through the actions of the corporation or associa-
tion. 1 9 The term "association" was also inserted into subsection (c), ex-
panding coverage to include some groups that arguably did not fall within
the old statute. 120
B. Specific Offenses
1. Involuntary Manslaughter
In the light of the court of criminal appeals opinion in Williams v.
State,121 the legislature expanded section 19.05, relating to voluntary man-
slaughter, to include death resulting from operation of an airplane, helicop-
ter, or boat while intoxicated. 122 Additionally, the definition of intoxication
was changed to incorporate the per se definition of intoxication as well as the
impairment definition.' 23
114. The following section references will be to the Texas Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
115. Tex. H.B. 846, 70th Leg. (1987).
116. Id.
117. Tex. H.B. 527, 70th Leg. (1987).
118. Tex. S.B. 1277, 70th Leg. (1987).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
122. Tex. S.B. 120, 70th Leg. (1987).
123. Id., see supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
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2. Aggravated Sexual Assault
Through two bills, one in the regular session and one in the called session,
the legislature amended section 22.021 to make it possible for an individual
to commit aggravated sexual assault on a spouse. 124 Basically, this was ac-
complished by deleting the reference to section 22.011, the sexual assault
statute. 125
3. Child Custody
Several changes were made to the Texas Penal Code in regard to the pro-
visions relating to child custody and orders entered from family law courts.
Section 25.03 was expanded to include an individual who takes a child out of
the ordering court's jurisdiction without permission of the court and with
the intent to deprive the court of authority over that child, or a noncustodial
parent who entices or persuades a child to leave the custody of the custodial
parent or guardian. 126 Additionally, an amendment to subsection (c) relat-
ing to defenses now makes it actionable for a person to take a child out of the
court's jurisdiction, rather than requiring that the child be taken out of the
state. 127 The legislature also created a new offense by the adoption of section
25.031, making it a third degree felony to agree, for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration, to abduct a child knowing that the child is under
the care or control of another pursuant to court order 128
The legislature changed section 25.08, dealing with the violation of court
orders, by expanding the locations that are protected under a protective or-
der. 129 Two new subsections were also added. 130 Subsection (e) makes the
violation provisions inapplicable to the applicant for the order or a person
that the order is intended to protect.131 Subsection (f) precludes a defense to
information excluded from the order pursuant to section 71.11 of the Texas
Family Code. 132
4. Gift to Public Servant
The legislature also amended the gift provision of section 36.10. Section
36.10 now provides that an item received by a public servant, regardless of
value, is not characterized as a "gift" if it is listed on a financial statement
filed pursuant to the Election Code. 133 Previously, the acceptance of an item
124. Tex. H.B. 161, 70th Leg. (1987); Tex. S.B. 35, 70th Leg. 2d Called Sess. (1987).
125. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021 (repealed 1987) provided: "(a) A person commits
an offense if the person commits sexual assault as defined in § 22.011 of this Code and: .... "
Id. § 22.011 (Vernon Supp. 1988) provides an exception to the offense if the victim was the
actor's spouse. New § 22.021 deletes the reference to § 22.011 and states simply: "(a) A
person commits an offense: .... " Id. § 22.021.
126. Tex. H.B. 113, 70th Leg. (1987).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Tex. S.B. 1111, 70th Leg. (1987).
130. Tex. S.B. 887, 70th Leg. (1987).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Tex. H.B. 612, 70th Leg. (1987).
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of benefit by a public servant would have been punishable under sections
36.08 or 36.09 as a class A misdemeanor.1 34
5. Failure to Identify
Under amended section 38.02 a person commits an offense if he refuses to
report or give his name, residence address, or date of birth to a police officer
who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information. 135 Pre-
viously, section 38.02 applied only to witnesses. That application is main-
tained, but the legislature has expanded it to make it an offense if a potential
witness gives false or fictitious information to the peace officer. 136
6 Presumptions Relating to Evading Arrest
Changes to section 38.04 elevate the class of the offense of evading arrest
in certain circumstances from a class "B" misdemeanor to a class "A" mis-
demeanor. 137 The offense will be a class "A" misdemeanor if the actor, in
evading arrest, engages in conduct placing another in eminent danger of seri-
ous bodily injury by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated while evad-
ing arrest. 138
7. Judicial Officers
Amendments to section 30.03 make it an offense for a public servant to
reveal intentionally the results or contents of a proposed or actual appellate
judicial decision prior to its release as a public record or its announcement to
all parties of interest on an equal basis.139 The amendment makes both the
person who released the information and the person who requested the infor-
mation liable. 140 As originally drafted, the amendments precluded appellate
judges from talking among themselves or their staffs about pending cases,
which would have effectively shut down the appellate courts of the state.
During the second call session, the original draft was amended to create an
exception for communications within the same court. 14 1 Nevertheless, the
law ultimately adopted makes no exception for an individual who merely
calls the court to check on the status of a pending case. 142
& Gambling
Under changes to section 47.01 the definition of "bet" does not include an
offer of merchandise with a value of $25 or less at carnival games.143 Fol-
134. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 36.08 (Vernon Supp. 1988) & 36.09 (Vernon 1974).
135. Tex. H.B. 826, 70th Leg. (1987).
136. Id.
137. Tex. H.B. 280, 70th Leg. (1987).
138. Id.
139. Tex. H.B. 288, 70th Leg. (1987).
140. Id.
141. Tex. H.B. 123, 70th Leg. (1987).
142. Id.
143. Tex. S.B. 342, 70th Leg. (1987).
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lowing the court of appeals opinion in Adley v. State,'44 the legislature
sought to clarify the definition of "book-making." Under the new section
47.03 "book-making" is defined as:
(1) the receiving and recording of or the forwarding of more than five
bets or offers to bet in one 24-hour period; (2) the receiving and record-
ing of or the forwarding of bets or offers to bet totalling more than
$1,000 in one 24-hour period; or (3) a scheme by three or more persons
to receive, record, or forward bets or offers to bet.145
9. Open Container Provision
In one of the more publicized acts of the legislature, article 6701(d), sec-
tion 107(E) of the revised civil statutes was amended to make it unlawful for
a person to consume an alcoholic beverage while operating a motor vehicle
in a public place.' 46 The offense must be observed by a peace officer and is a
class "C" misdemeanor. 147 Note that an open container may still by used to
enhance a DWI conviction pursuant to section 67011 (1)(f). 148
10. Drugs
Several provisions of the Controlled Substances Act were amended to tar-
get specific abuses. Article 4476-13(a), dealing with glues and aerosol paints,
now incorporates a culpable mental state of recklessness in the delivery of a
volatile chemical to a minor. 149 Additionally, a new offense of possessing
"inhalant paraphernalia" is created.' 50 Inhalant paraphernalia is defined as
any possible contrivance that might be used by an individual to ingest any
type of volatile chemical.151 It will be interesting to see if this definition
survives a constitutional attack for vagueness.
The legislature amended article 4476-14 relating to anabolic steroids and
growth hormones, to enumerate sixteen various hormones to be con-
trolled. 152 New provisions make it a third degree felony for an individual to
prescribe, dispense, deliver, or administer these drugs without a valid medi-
cal purpose. 153
The legislature also amended article 4476-15 to target controlled sub-
stance "analogues."' 4 An "analogue" is a substance, the chemical structure
144. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
145. Tex. S.B. 342, 70th Leg. (1987).
146. Tex. S.B. 521, 70th Leg (1987).
147. Id.
148. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1(f) (Vernon Supp. 1988) provides:
If it is shown on the trial of a person punished for an offense under this article
that the person committed the offense and at the time of the offense the person
operating the motor vehicle had an open container of an alcoholic beverage in
his immediate possession, the minimum term of confinement for the offense is
increased by: ....
149. Tex. H.B. 173, 70th Leg. (1987).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Tex. S.B. 1035, 70th Leg. (1987).
153. Id.
154. Tex. H.B. 685, 70th Leg. (1987).
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of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled
substance in penalty groups 1 and 2 or a substance that has been specifically
designed to produce an affect substantially similar to or greater than the
effect of such a controlled substance. 155 Generally, the penalties for an ana-
logue carry the same penalty as the substance it attempts to imitate.1 56
155. Id.
156. Id.
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